To capture the experience of skilled operators in response to alarm notifications, a systematic method of process discovery for operator actions in response to univariate alarms is proposed. The contributions of the paper are two folds. First, the transitions of alarm states are defined and formulated as a Petri net model. Second, the methods of process discovery through Alarm & Event logs are presented, where the logs are segmented and reorganized in a format suitable for processing by process discovery algorithms. Finally, the effectiveness and practicality of the proposed methods are illustrated using an industrial case study.
INTRODUCTION
In industrial facilities, human operators have the ability to apply corrective actions to control the respective processes. This is achieved by regulating control devices physically or by using an Operator Interface System (OIS). The OISs display a great amount of information from the processes, including process measurements, device status, and alarms. In addition, they also have the capacity to historize the information for future access and analysis. The displayed alarms provide the operators with a clear and precise indication of the processes that require further attention. Consequently, operators can interact with the respective processes by regulating the control devices to resolve abnormalities. For example, when an alarm is annunciated, operators can change a device status, and when normal operating conditions are resumed, the operators can acknowledge the alarm. Alternatively, the operators can suppress the alarm in an attempt to ignore its existence temporarily.
In recent research studies, process alarms have been explored from different aspects: in (Hu et al., 2015) , the detection of correlated alarms and the quantification of the correlation levels were addressed; in (Lai & Chen, 2015) , a method for pattern mining in multiple alarm flood sequences was proposed; in (Wang & Chen, 2014) , a method for the removal of chattering and repeating alarms was provided; and in (Schleburg et al., 2013) , the reduction of the number of displayed alarms is studied. Further, it is also necessary to study the relation between the process alarms and the corresponding operator actions in order to specify proper operational procedures. This is of significant importance, especially as improper operational procedures can cause further abnormalities and faults which can potentially result in alarm chattering and floods, accidents, and economical loss. The U.S. industry alone loses $13 billion per year by incorrectly responding to alarms (GE Intelligent Platforms, 2013) . In addition, specifying proper operational procedures provides the means for decision support capabilities which can potentially result in further enhancement in the efficiency and productivity of the processes as well as in reducing fatigue of operators. It has been mentioned that worker fatigue costs U.S. companies $77 -$150 billion per year in increased health care costs, lost production and damage sustained during accidents (Walker et al., 2003) .
In this paper, alarm notifications and the operator actions are jointly used in the development of comprehensive models of proper operational procedures. More specifically, the following questions are addressed. How can the historized information be used to discover the sequences of alarms and the corresponding operator actions? How can the models of proper operational procedures be developed from the discovered sequences? Finally, what potential findings can be specified from the developed models for use as training and enhancement benchmarks?
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses operator actions during process abnormalities. In Section III, the alarm state transitions are formulated as Petri net models. Section IV proposes methods to transform historized information of the alarms and the corresponding operator actions into workflow models. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed method is illustrated using an industrial case study in Section V, followed by concluding remarks in Section VI.
ALARM SYSTEMS AND HUMAN FACTORS
This section discusses industrial alarm systems and the role of operators in managing process abnormalities and faults. Furthermore, examples of operator actions for regulating different process devices and systems are summarized.
Industrial Alarm Systems
Alarm systems are critical assets of modern industrial facilities as they can assist operators in regulating the processes and managing abnormalities and faults. They generally consist of many interconnected parts, e.g. the basic process control system (BPCS), safety instrumented system (SIS), annunciator panel, and alarm database (ISA-18.2, 2009 ). To design, implement, and maintain alarm systems, standards and guides such as EEMUA-191 (EEMUA-191, 2013) and ISA-18.2 (ISA-18.2, 2009) have been published and are widely accepted by industrial practitioners. These standards and many practical alarm management techniques have been used to guarantee the effectiveness of alarm systems and to ensure process safety (Rothenberg, 2009) . Alarms are generated by alarm systems to attract attention of operators with the form of visual or audible messages. Accordingly, operators respond to manage abnormalities and faults. Operator actions depend on the seriousness of abnormalities corresponding to the annunciated alarms. Hence, the analysis of operator actions should provide insight and help in alarm rationalization and construction of decision support systems.
Operator Actions Responded to Alarms
When an alarm is annunciated, operators take a series of actions to manage process abnormalities, e.g. changing the operating status of devices, adjusting values of some signals, and communicating with other operators and departments. The authors in (Rothenberg, 2009) 
where x s t = 1 denotes a abnormal state, while x s t = 0 represents a normal state, ω is a monitored variable, and Ω is the universe of normal operating values. Further, the variable x s t is not directly displayed to operators as an alarm signal. In an industrial OIS, the alarm is activated whenever x s t = 1. By contrast, the clearing of an alarm is associated with acknowledgement actions, i.e., the alarm will keep annunciating until the operator resolves the abnormality and presses an acknowledgement button.
The acknowledgement state x c is associated with the process state and the acknowledgement action. The variable x c is formulated as
where b t is the acknowledgement action by an operator, such that b t = 1 denotes the acknowledgement of an alarm. Accordingly, the alarm annunciating state variable x a presented to an operator is defined as
An example of the relation of the process state, alarm annunciating state and acknowledgment state variables defined above is given in Fig. 1 . The alarm is acknowledged in two manners, namely, before the return-to-normal and after the return-to-normal of x s t , respectively. Remark 1: The alarm in eqn. (3) is different from the definitions in the existing literatures: The alarm annunciating variable x a t indicates the visible or audible alarm state that can be observed by an operator, whereas the alarm defined in (Wang & Chen, 2014; Hu et al., 2015) is the process state variable x s t in eqn. (1). 
Petri Net of Alarm State Transitions
The minimum number of necessary tokens on p is defined as t − (p) := V (p, t) for (p, t) ∈ F while the number of tokens added to p upon firing of t is defined as t Tables 2 and  3 , respectively. The weights of all arcs are identical and equal to 1 and each place can hold one token at most. Thus, the Petri net of alarm state transitions is a typical condition/event net (Popova-Zeugmann, 2013). According to Fig. 2 , the initial state of the Petri net model is m = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1), i.e., an abnormality emerges and t 1 ∈ T is enabled. When an abnormality occurs, i.e. ω t / ∈ Ω and the alarm is activated (ALM), t 1 and the token is transferred to p 2 and the acknowledgement state is reset to x c t = 0. With m = (0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0), transitions t 1 and t 3 are enabled. If t 1 fires, the token enters p 2 and t 3 becomes disabled. The final state is achieved as m = (0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1) once t 2 fires. By contrast, if t 3 fires, the token enters p 3 and p 6 and t 1 becomes disabled. Once t 4 fires, the token enters p 4 and reaches the end of the Petri net model. Alarm returns to normal (RTN)
Often times, operators may choose not to display certain alarms, because of nuisance alarms or changes of operating states. In such cases, operators can suppress the alarms using commands such as "shelve" or "disable" (ISA-18.2, 2009). As a result, the alarm will no longer be displayed on the OIS. To Incorporate the suppression action, a complementary part of the Petri net model shown in Fig. 2 is constructed and presented in Fig. 3 . The transition t 6 represents suppression action while t 5 denotes an unsuppression action. Accordingly, p 7 and p 8 represent the suppressed and unsuppressed states, respectively. t xy indicates any of t i , i = 1, 2, ..., 4 in Fig. 2 . p x and p y are the pre-state and post-state of t xy . Fig. 3 . Alarm state transitions with the suppression action.
In general, the clearing of alarms is often associated with operator actions. Thus, it is important to include operator actions in the analysis of alarm state transitions. To achieve this, process mining techniques can be exploited to construct workflow models from historized information of the alarms and the corresponding operator actions Dasani et al. (2015) .
Remark 2: Depending on data acquisition systems, the acknowledgement state variable x c may not be recorded in the A&E log. In consequence, the Petri net model of alarm state transitions in Fig. 2 
is simplified as
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PROCESS DISCOVERY THROUGH A&E LOGS
This section aims at discovering operator actions as related to the transitions of the alarm states using the Alarm & Event (A&E) logs.
Definitions and Properties of A&E Logs
An A&E log contains time stamped textual messages of alarms and recorded actions of operators. These events are uniquely labeled by tag names and are assigned with attributes such as the event type, priority, location, and process description. The behaviors of alarms and operator actions are distinct. For any alarm tag, its occurrence and clearance always exist in pairs, whereas the operator actions are not necessarily documented in this fashion. Prior to process discovery using A&E logs, the definitions of events, logs, and sequences are given as follows. ∈ V, where V is a set of tags. The sequential form of L is denoted asL, where all events are chronologically sorted, i.e., e ∈ V k . The set V k consists of tags related to the same process, system, or unit, predefined based on process knowledge.
The raw event log L from a typical industrial facility often consists of alarm and action events related to many processes. When it is needed to study some specific alarms or actions in a given domain V k , e (v) / ∈ V k prevents one from getting an accurate workflow model. For process discovery, one event log should only relates to one process (Van Der Aalst, 2011) . Thus, the sub-event log L k defined on V k should be extracted from L. As a result, the task of process discovery using A&E log L is decomposed into sub-tasks for sub-event logs L k defined on V k .
Rather than recording structured process instances, L k contains events over a long time period. Usually, there are no identifiers indicating how events are associated with abnormalities at different time instants. Thus, L k is known as an unlabeled event log according to Walicki & Ferreira (2011) . Unlabeled event logs cannot be processed by process discovery algorithms unless their process instances are explicit. Thus, it is necessary to detect process instances, which are identified by cases defined as follows.
(1) The events in C must relate to the execution of the same task. Thus, given any event E i ∈ C, there must be E j ∈ C which is the cause or effect of
.., E |C| > is called a trace, which is the sequential form of C. |C| indicates the number of events in C orC.
The task in the first item of Definition 3 is referred to as the entire life cycle from the occurrence of an abnormality to the all-clear state. As indicated by Van Der Aalst (2011) , an event log consists of cases and a case consists of events. Process discovery aims at capturing workflow models through a number of cases. Thus, the segmentation of a sub-event log L k into a group of cases C i , i = 1, 2..., n is the foremost step of process discovery.
Segmentation of A&E Logs
According to Definitions 2 and 3, the segmentation of a raw event log L involves two dimensions. The first dimensional segmentation is to decompose L into sub-event logs L k , k ∈ N + , based on predefined domains, such as chemical processes, systems, or groups of tags. For each sub-event log L k , process discovery can be implemented independently. Generally, the process knowledge is required to achieve such segmentation. For a given domain V k , the tags v ∈ V k should hold some connectivity or their processes should be correlated. The connectivity information can be identified using Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) and can be represented as signed directed graphs (Yang et al., 2014) . The correlations and causal relations can be detected from process signals or binary-valued alarm signals (Duan et al., 2013; Hu et al., 2015) .
The second dimensional segmentation is to partition L k into traces. This process is also known as the trace labeling. According to the first item of Definition 3, the trace labeling of L k can be achieved based on the lifecycle from the occurrence to the clearing of one abnormality. However, the abnormal information is always implicit. Instead, the alarm state transitions corresponding to abnormalities are explicit fromL k . For one specific alarm variable x a ∈ V k , the events of alarm occurrence and alarm clearance of x a can always be found in pairs from L k . As a result, the trace labeling can be achieved using Algorithm 1.
Based on Algorithm 1, the tracesC j , j ∈ N + , obtained from L k , have the following features: (1) The head of
. As a result, the process discovery only focuses on the operator actions for x a . (2) The events happened during the time period from the "RTN" or "ACK" to the "ALM" of x a are excluded to avoid cyclic models.
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Process Discovery with ProM
Process discovery is a typical process mining technique used to transform a structured event log into workfow models without using any apriori knowledge. The workflow models have various forms, such as Petri nets, causal nets, and business process models. Towards constructing accurate workflow models, a variety of algorithms have been proposed, including the abstraction-based algorithms, heuristic-based algorithms, and search-based algorithms (van Dongen et al., 2009; Günther & Van Der Aalst, 2007) . Further, α algorithm is a very first abstractionbased algorithm which works by inferring the ordering relations. However, α algorithm requires complete event log and lacks the ability to deal with noises. Oriented towards noisy event logs, the heuristic algorithms work better by incorporating the frequencies of events. For event logs that are not well-structured, the fuzzy miner is a good choice for inferring useful abstraction of events.
All of the above algorithms have been integrated into a popular open-source process mining tool called ProM (van Dongen et al., 2005) . ProM provides a variety of process mining techniques that are quite comprehensive in functions and are easy to implement. ProM can handle various event logs of different structures and sizes, and can also export the workflow models into distinct paradigms. In this paper, ProM is used to identify behaviors of operator actions for alarms. Given an A&E log L, the data is preprocessed and reorganized in a format that is suitable to be processed by process discovery algorithms. Using ProM, workflow models of operator actions and alarm state transitions are generated as Petri nets.
INDUSTRIAL CASE STUDY
To illustrate the effectiveness and practicality of the proposed methods, the A&E log from an oil pipeline system is used as an industrial case study. The oil pipeline system transports batches of petroleum products from upstream oil plants to downstream tank terminals through 28 pump stations distributed in western Canada. The alarms and action events were collected and historized using a SCADA system. The A&E log L for the case study covered the year 2014 and contained 2,368 unique tags. A portion of the A&E log is shown in Table 4 . The first column indicates the time stamps with date information omitted, and the second column displays the names of pump stations. The tag names are shown in the third column, while the last column indicates the activities. The activity "CS1 CMDOpen" indicates that an operator from control station 1 (CS1) sent a command to open a valve. The activity "Valve traveling" indicates that the valve was traveling after received the command , and "Valve opened" indicates that the valve was opened successfully. To proceed with process discovery of univariate alarms, the chattering alarms were removed from L using a uniform 30 seconds off-delay timer. Then, the first dimensional segmentation of L is achieved based on the pump stations. By extracting the events related to pump station "PSN1", a sub-event log L 1 is obtained. Then, we analyzed operator actions in response to alarm tag "S1P1.LO". Using the proposed trace labeling algorithm, 98 traces are identified. The fuzzy miner in ProM is used to construct the workflow model and export it as a Petri net model in Fig. 4 . The annotations of the transitions in Fig. 4 are given in Table 5 , while the places in Fig. 4 are implicit. It can be found that the operator often sent commands to open the valve "S1V1" to resolve the alarm "S1P1.LO". The split from t 0 to t 1 and t 2 indicates that this command could be given from either of the two control stations (CS1 and CS2). The captured workflow model for another alarm tag "S2L6.HI" from pump station "PSN2" is shown as a Petri net model in Fig. 5 . The transition annotations are listed in Table 6 , while the places in Fig. 4 are implicit. It can be found that the occurrence of "S2L6.HI" was often followed by the occurrences of "S2L6.HIHI" and "S2L6.HIHIHI". The effective action to resolve these alarms was identified to be a change in alarm limit. It was also noted Table 5 . Petri net transitions in Fig. 4 .
Transition Annotation t 0 S1P1.LO : ALM t 1 S1V1 : CS1 CMD-Open t 2 S1V1 : CS2 CMD-Open t 3 S1V1 : Valve traveling t 4 S1V1 : Valve opened t 5 S1P1.LO : RTN that if "S2L6.HI" was annunciated, but "S2L6.HIHI" and "S2L6.HIHIHI" were not displayed, no action was taken by the operators and "S2L6.HI" returned to normal after a period of time. Industrial alarm systems are critical for managing hazardous situations. The interactions between alarm systems and operators ensure a more efficient and productive operation of the processes. However, past research on alarm management has only focused on alarms, whereas operator actions during process abnormalities are vital but rarely studied. The work in this paper aims at discovering models of operator actions in response to univariate alarms. The paper provides explicit definitions of binary signals related to alarm variables, based on which Petri net models of alarm state transitions are constructed. Furthermore, to incorporate operator actions in Petri net models of alarm state transitions, methods to transform A&E logs into workflow models are proposed. The effectiveness and practicality of the proposed methods are illustrated using an oil pipeline system as an industrial case study.
